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South Asian countries, facing challenges in efficiently meet-
ing growing electricity demand, can benefit from increased 
cross-border electricity cooperation and trade by harnessing 
complementarities in electricity demand patterns, diver-
sity in resource endowments for power generation, and 
gains from larger market access. The region has witnessed 
slow progress in expanding regional electricity coopera-
tion and trade, and undertaking needed domestic sector 
reforms. Although bilateral electricity sector cooperation 
in the region is increasing, broader regional cooperation 
and trade initiatives have lagged in the face of regional bar-
riers and domestic sector inefficiencies. Deeper electricity 
market reforms are not a necessity for further development 
of cross-border electricity trade, but limited progress in 
overcoming regional and domestic barriers will limit the 
scope of the regional market and the benefits it can provide.
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Cross-Border Electricity Cooperation in South Asia1 
 
1. Introduction 
Access to reliable, affordable and cleaner energy is a high priority to facilitate further 
economic development and improved welfare of the population in the South Asia 
region (SAR).2 Access to adequate and high-quality energy is part of a larger effort 
toward reducing adverse impacts of infrastructure scarcity in the region (Andres, 
Biller and Dappe 2013a, 2013b; Ghosh Banarjee et al, 2015).  In SAR, poor access to 
electricity combines with unreliable supply due to chronic electricity shortages and 
unexpected interruptions.3 Shortages and unpredictable availability of electricity also 
have led to costly and environmentally harmful investment in small-scale back-up 
generators (World Bank 2013a, 24).  
 
Strengthening cross-border electricity cooperation in South Asia can be part of the 
solution for providing adequate and reliable electricity availability. One reason is that 
there are complementarities in electricity demand and resource endowments among 
these countries due to diversity of primary energy resources and differences in 
seasonal patterns of supply and demand.  In addition, increased electricity cooperation 
and trade among countries can bring economies of scale in investments, strengthen 
electricity sector financing capability, enhance competition and improve sector 
efficiency, and enable more cost-effective renewable electricity penetration (Timilsina 
et al, 2015; Singh et al., 2013; ESMAP, 2010;Srivastava and Mishra, 2007; Thakur, 
2004).For example, Nepal and Bhutan have comparative advantages in hydropower 
																																																								
1Anoop Singh (corresponding author; anoops@iitk.ac.in) is an Associate Professor in the Department 
of Industrial and Management Engineering at the Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur; ToorajJamasb 
(tooraj.jamasb@durham.ac.uk) is a Professor in Energy Economics in the School of Business at 
Durham University; Rabindra Nepal (r.nepal@uq.edu.au) is a Research Fellow in the School of 
Economics at The University of Queensland; Michael Toman (mtoman@worldbank.org) is Lead 
Economist and Manager of Environment and Energy Unit, Development Research Group, World Bank, 
Washington, DC. This research was supported by funding to the World Bank from the UK Department 
for International Development and the Australian Agency for International Development.  	
2In this paper, the South Asia Region (SAR) refers to Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and 
Sri Lanka.  Afghanistan and Maldives also are in this region as it is defined by the world Bank, but we 
do not cover them in this paper..	
3The countries in the South Asia region are home to around 1.57 billion people (23.7% of global 
population), while covering only around 4% of the global landmass. Around 493 million people lived 
devoid of any electricity access across South Asia in 2009, despite electricity sector reforms in the 
region (IEA, 2011). In 2010, average per capita electricity consumption in the region was recorded to 
be 563 kWh as compared to the world average of 2977 kWh (Singh et al., 2013).	
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production that can only be realized with cross-border trade.  Those countries also 
experience significant declines in hydroelectric generation during the winter season, 
and thus would benefit from improved access to thermal-based electricity generation 
from neighboring countries. 
 
Efforts to expand cross-border electricity cooperation and trade in SAR need to be 
address several barriers.  Some of these reflect elements of the regional-level political 
climate, while others arise due to limited scope and extent of domestic electricity 
sector policies and renovations. Review of the reform process and identification of 
barriers to cross-border electricity trade are the main objectives of this paper. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the status of 
cross-border electricity cooperation in SAR. Section 3 identifies key regional-level 
barriers to expanding cross-border cooperation and trade in SAR.  Section 4 discusses 
the extent to which current domestic sector policies impede greater cross-border 
electricity cooperation.  Section 5 summarizes the findings of the paper and offers 
some policy recommendations for moving ahead on increased cross-border trade and 
cooperation. 
 
2. Current Status of Cross-Border Electricity Cooperation in South 
Asia 
Increased regional electricity cooperation can be seen as part of a larger interest in 
expanded trade and cross-border market integration. General interest in regional 
economic cooperation has existed for some time in SAR; it predates the formation of 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985. The agreement 
for a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) signed in 2004 envisioned a transition 
toward a common market.  Tangible expressions of the interest in regional energy 
cooperation followed soon after the formation of SAFTA. The South Asia Regional 
Energy Coalition (SAREC) in 2006 was formed to promote advocacy initiatives by 
leading policy-oriented business associations in South Asia. The SAARC Energy 
Centre (SEC), established in 2006 as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) with its base in 
Islamabad, Pakistan, also has had a focus on regional energy sector cooperation in 
South Asia.   
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In late 2014, SAARC member states agreed to a “framework agreement” for regional 
cooperation in electricity.4  The agreement contains broad-ranging provisions for the 
establishment of a regional market for electricity, including nondiscriminatory access 
to transmission, market-based pricing of electricity exchanged, and establishment of a 
body for coordinating regional power integration and trade.  It remains to be seen how 
extensively or rapidly these provisions will be put into practice. 
 
At present simple bilateral arrangements for power transmission and trade are 
predominant.  In particular, bilateral generation and transmission arrangements 
between Nepal-India, India-Bhutan and most recently India-Bangladesh dominate 
regional electricity cooperation in South Asia (Singh et al., 2013; Srivastava and 
Mishra, 2007; Paudyal, 2013). Table 1 summarizes the current state of cross-border 
arrangements for electricity sector cooperation in South Asia. These bilateral 
relationships are mostly based on government-to-government relationships, with a 
limited to minimal role played by the private sector. 5 
 
2.1. Nepal-India Electricity Cooperation 
Nepal relies heavily on energy imports from India, which includes importing energy 
products like electricity, diesel generations and petroleum products and inverters. The 
history of bilateral electricity cooperation between Nepal and India dates back to as 
early as 1920s. The Kataiya powerhouse, and Trishuli, Devighat and Phewa 
hydropower projects were some of the initial government-to government 
hydroelectric schemes implemented in Nepal with the financial and technical 
assistance from the Government of India (GoI). Development of the 1 MW 
hydroelectric project in 1968 at Pokhara with the Indian assistance laid the foundation 
for how broader electricity sector cooperation between Nepal and India. This was 
followed up by a 21 MW plant at Trisuli (1969), 15 MW plant on Western Gandak 
																																																								
4See http://www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/SAARC-FRAMEWORK-AGREEMENT-FOR-ENERGY-
COOPERATION-ELECTRICITY.pdf. 
5The private sector is starting to become more involved in cross-border power projects.  A number of 
Indian investors are developing large power projects in Nepal, part of which can serve the export 
market.  A number of power generation projects in Bhutan as well Nepal are witnessing participation 
of private investors, including those from within South Asia. As of December 2014, 161 mostly small 
hydro projects (totaling about 2000 MW) have been developed and are under development in Nepal. 
Most of the small projects are being developed by the private investors. 
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(1979) and 14.1 MW plant at Devi Ghat (1983). By 1971, Nepal and India had signed 
a Power Purchase Agreement with limited low-capacity exchange at various locations 
along the Nepal-India border. Under this border town exchange program, electric 
utilities in Nepal and India (Bihar) provide access to electricity to the towns that are 
accessible easily from across the border through a number of 11 kV and 33 kV cross-
border interconnections. 
 
Participants Cross-border electricity trade 
India – Nepal Nepal imported 793GWh electricity in 2013 from India over multiple interconnections. 
India-Bhutan 
Electricity import from Bhutan to India was 5556 GWh in 2013-14 
(4627 GWh in 2012-13) from Hydro power stations at Tala, Chukha and 
Kurichu with a total export led capacity of 1416 MW.   
As per an umbrella agreement between the two countries, India assures 
a minimum of 5000 MWelectricity import by 2020. 
Pakistan-Iran Pakistan imported 419 GWh electricity in 2014 from Iran, up from 375 GWh in the previous year. 
Afghanistan-
Central Asia 
Import of 2,246.2 GWh electricity from Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Tajikistan in 2011. CASA-1000 expected to enhance this trade. 
Pakistan-India 
Pakistan has submitted a draft MoU to India on importing electricity 
using a 1200 MW interconnection. There are also possibilities of CASA 
to be extended to India. 
India-Sri Lanka Feasibility studies for a 400-kV India-Sri Lanka have been conducted to support import of up to 1000 MW electricity from India. 
India-Bangladesh 
In 2013, power systems of India and Bangladesh were interconnected 
through a HVDC line that can support electricity export of up to 500 
MW (expandable to 1000 MW in future) from India to Bangladesh 
based on negotiated price and market based price. 
Table 1: Existing and some proposed cross-border electricity trade arrangements in 
South Asia 
Source:  Compilation from Singh et al. (2013), NTDC (2014), ERLD (2014) 
 
 
The two countries signed a treaty in 1996 for integrated development of the Mahakali 
River basin, including Sarada barrage, Tanakpur barrage and Pancheshwar projects. 
In July 2001, the GoI nominated the Power Trading Corporation (PTC) as the nodal 
agency to deal with matters relating to power exchange with Nepal (Mittra, 2012). 
PTC is also the sole agency from the Indian side for finalizing commercial and 
technical arrangements/systems with the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) and 
coordinating with associated Indian agencies. A power trade agreement was signed 
between Nepal and India in October 2014 to expand the bilateral electricity trade 
between the two nations. The completion of two double-circuit transmission corridors 
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between Dhalkebar-Muzaffarpur (90 kms) and Hetaua-Duhabi (40 kms) (partly 
funded by the World Bank), coupled with the operation of a combined 20,000 MW 
capacity of hydropower projects undergoing feasibility study in Western Nepal is 
expected to increase the electricity trade between India and Nepal.  
 
Generation capacity addition in Nepal significantly lags behind growing electricity 
demand, making Nepal a net importer of electricity from India (Figure 1). Electricity 
imports now account for nearly 20% of the total availability. Given the existing 
demand-supply mismatch in Nepal, it may continue to import electricity from India 
through the upcoming interconnections in the short-term. However, it can become a 
net exporter of electricity as the country develops its vast hydroelectric potential. 
Figure 1: Changing Balance of Electricity Trade between Nepal and India 
Source:  NEA (2013) 
 
 
2.2. Bhutan-India Electricity Cooperation 
Bhutan conducts 80% of its total trade with India; electricity trade constitutes 45% of 
Bhutan’s total exports. Electricity is Bhutan's principal export commodity and the 
largest revenue earner (ADB, 2013). In 2011-12, earnings from export of electricity to 
India accounted for 11.4% of the country’s GDP (Singh et al., 2013). The bilateral 
arrangements between India and Bhutan started with the Jaldhaka Agreement in 1961. 
The first hydroelectric plant (Joshina) of 360 kW capacity was commissioned in 1967 
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under the grant assistance of the GoI. Bilateral electricity connections from West 
Bengal and Assam were set up to electrify bordering villages and towns in Bhutan in 
the 1970s and 80s. The Chukha agreement was signed in 1974 for the joint 
development of a 336 MW hydropower plant (construction completed in 1988) in 
Bhutan between the GoI and the Royal government of Bhutan (RGoB) with financial 
assistance from India. Another agreement was signed between the GoI and RGoB in 
1994 for the joint development of the Kurichhu hydropower plant (60 MW) in 1994 
while the construction was completed in 2001-2002. Similarly, the Tala agreement 
was signed between the GoI and RGoB in 1996 while the construction of the Tala 
hydropower project (1020 MW) was completed in 2006. In 2006, an umbrella 
agreement was signed by the two countries to facilitate and cooperate in hydropower 
development and trade through public and private sector participation. Under this 
agreement, India agreed to import at least 5000 MW from Bhutan by 2020 (Singh et 
al., 2013). The PTC is the nodal agency responsible for the purchase and sale of 
power from Bhutan to India.  
 
Apart from gaining significant export income, a minimum 12% royalty from power 
projects prompted the Royal Government of Bhutan to target 100% electrification in 
the country by the end of 2013, while ensuring continuity of lifeline electricity 
consumption to its population. Access to thermal power from India during the dry 
winter season highlights mutual benefits of interdependency of the two power 
systems. 
 
2.3. India-Bangladesh Electricity Cooperation 
In January 2010, Bangladesh and India signed a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) to exchange electricity through a cross-border interconnection leading to 
development of a 400 kV, 30-km double-circuit HVDC line from Bheramara 
(Bangladesh) to Baharampur (India) and a 500 MW 400/230 KV back-to-back HVDC 
substation at Bheramara. The link has an initial capacity of 500 MW, which can be 
later expanded to 1000 MW (Singh et al., 2013). An electricity purchase pact was 
inked between NTPC VidyutVyapar Nigam in India and Bangladesh Power 
Development Board (BPDB) in Bangladesh in early 2012 for the import of electricity 
to Bangladesh. The 25-year government-to-government electricity purchase deal 
involves providing 250 MW of coal-fired electricity from India to Bangladesh. On 
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December 4, 2013, the full transmission power capacity of 500 MW was achieved 
(Brady, 2014). The Asian Development Bank (ADB) financed the project under an 
India-Bangladesh power exchange initiative. 
 
3.  Barriers to Cross-Border Electricity Cooperation 
The scope and extent of cross-border electricity cooperation varies across regions 
(Pineau, Hira and Froschauer, 2004; Oseni and Pollitt, 2014). Regional electricity 
cooperation for market integration typically evolves in the wake of bilateral cross-
border electricity trade arrangements. The more advanced arrangements incorporate 
shared generation assets and multi-country trading through integrated competitive 
markets. 
 
Regional agreements for power sector cooperation and trade can take time to achieve.  
For example, realization of the Central American Power Market (SIEPAC for its 
Spanish initials) took 23 years from the time the feasibility study was completed. 
Similarly, electricity sector cooperation in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) 
also witnessed a timeline spread over two decades, and still continues to evolve.  
 
Slow progress of cross-border electricity trade can be attributed to technical, 
operational, political and commercial issues. These vary according to socio-economic 
and political circumstances in the region. A number of electricity cooperation 
initiatives around the world have faced some common challenges, even in 
sophisticated OECD electricity systems (ESMAP, 2010). For example, transmission 
and trade cooperation arrangements, such as the Southern Africa Power Pool and the 
West African Power Pool, have failed to realize their full potential without 
development and timely implementation of a long-term transmission plan, and 
differing expectations of electricity prices by buyers and sellers (Singh et al., 2013).  
 
Arguably, the current state and magnitude of electricity cooperation and trade in SAR 
is far less than the potential considering the regional diversity of energy resource 
endowments and differences in demand patterns across countries in the region 
(Wijayatunga and Fernando, 2013; Singh et al., 2013,Timilsina et al, 2015).  We 
focus in this section on three regional-level barriers.  In the next section we consider 
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how weaknesses in domestic sector policies also impede cross-border cooperation and 
trade. 
 
3.1. Dynamic and Uncertain Regional Political Climate 
Historical animosity or lack of trust has often frustrated the process of regional 
cooperation in South Asia, including regional power sector cooperation. While there 
are encouraging signs, political rhetoric for electricity cooperation has not 
consistently translated into the political will and action for cooperation in South Asia 
(Paudyal, 2013). Internal political conflicts also have slowed down the process of 
regional electricity sector cooperation. In addition, the government-to-government 
model for cross-border trade typically involves lengthy political as well as technical 
negotiations, diminishing economic gains.  
 
Regional cooperation is perceived by some as a threat to national safety and energy 
security, as reflected in debates over power trade between India and Pakistan 
(Mukherji and Chaturvedi, 2013). In another case, inability of the Bangladeshi 
government to provide a guaranteed supply of natural gas for a proposed USD 3 
billion power project investment in Bangladesh by an Indian company resulted in the 
latter abandoning the business venture altogether (Rahman et al., , 2012). On the other 
hand, entry of Chinese investment has prompted India to explore electricity 
cooperation with Sri Lanka and Nepal (Chaturvedi, 2013; Mittra, 2012).  
 
The ability of the cross-border trade of electricity to address public interest, social and 
environmental concerns has been questioned (Williams and Ghanadan, 2006). For 
example, large-scale development of water resources in Nepal and Bhutan will 
generate significant economic rents. Debates over the distribution of such rents can 
generate conflicts and opposition to large-scale resource development initiatives. 
 
3.2 Absence of a Platform for Cross-Border Regulatory Coordination 
Increased electricity cooperation and trade in the region requires national regulators to 
pay more attention to harmonization and coordination of their regulatory practices. 
Technical aspects such as rules and procedures concerning transmission access and its 
pricing, congestion management, operational codes and protocols for system 
operation, energy accounting and payment thereof, and data transfer protocols need to 
	 10	
be gradually harmonized for seamless and stable operation of the transmission 
systems.6  
 
3.3. Tariff and Non-Tariff Market Barriers 
Like other commodities and services, trade in electricity is hindered by export tax, 
import duty and transit tax. The South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), when 
signed, did not give special treatment to energy, particularly electricity trade. 
Although signing in 2014 of the SAARC Framework Agreement for Energy 
Cooperation (Electricity) during 18th SAARC Summit in Kathmandu has given 
impetus to expanded regional power trade, more needs to be done for implementation 
of a regional agreement for free trade of electricity.  For example, electricity import 
licensing restrictions in India that limit participation to specifically identified (so-
called nodal) agencies also limit entry in cross-border trade and hinder the 
development of power exchange (Singh et al., 2013). 
 
Power sector trade-related reforms also are inter-dependent with wider reforms, and 
failure to harmonize inter-sector reforms can lead to power sector reform measures 
being ineffective (Nepal and Jamasb, 2012b). For example, India and Sri Lanka are 
yet to sign a free trade agreement, while India also has been reluctant to waive 
imports duty for imported construction equipment and materials to Nepal from a third 
country. Similarly, Pakistan is yet to grant Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to 
enhance trade with India.  
 
4. Impact of National Electricity Sector Policies on Cross-Border 
Cooperation and Trade in South Asia 
 
In addition to regional-level barriers to increased cross-border electricity cooperation 
and trade in SAR, weaknesses in domestic sector policies also create impediments.  
To build the case for this assertion, in this section we review the status of sector 
policies and performance in SAR.   
 
																																																								
6 Establishing a SAARC level Transmission System Operator (TSO) or Coordination Forum of System 
Operators is an option as national transmission grids get increasingly integrated. HVDC 
interconnections, while costly,  allow some flexibility due to asynchronous operation of the 
interconnected power systems. 
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4.1 Overview of Power Sector Reforms in South Asia 
Countries in the South Asia region initiated national electricity sector reforms 
following somewhat different timelines, as shown in Table 2 below.7 The process of 
reform in the power sector was undertaken to address several ongoing problems: the 
fiscal burden of price subsidies and low revenue collection rates, and the economic 
burden of low service quality, and high network losses experienced under largely 
state-owned and controlled systems (Newbery, 2002, Singh, 2006). One of the 
objectives of sector reform in SAR (as elsewhere) is to attract more domestic and 
foreign private sector investments (Singh, 2007).  Other objectives include reducing 
dependence on state support and ensuring affordable and reliable service quality 
(Lama et al., 2002).To accomplish these aims, it is ultimately necessary to manage 
sector activities in a more economically efficient and competitive manner.8  
 
As indicated in Table 2, the single buyer model (SBM) (one buyer and many sellers) 
dominates the wholesale generation market arrangements across the region. Only 
India has introduced a degree of competition in wholesale markets for electricity, and 
a day-ahead market (Singh 2010; Thakur et al., 2005). Vertically integrated 
incumbent electric utilities in Pakistan and India have undertaken functional 
unbundling (Singh et al., 2013). Most of the larger states in India have unbundled the 
erstwhile State Electricity Boards (SEBs) into separate corporatized entities for 
generation, transmission and distribution. Due to a provision of the Electricity Act of 
2003, the bulk power procurement activity of the unbundled transmission utilities has 
been separated out from the provision of transmission.  
 
Partial unbundling has been undertaken in Bhutan, as well as Sri Lanka. By law, 
Bhutan has designated a government entity to be the single buyer of electricity for all 
power projects, including the private ones.  The electricity sector in Bangladesh is 
																																																								
7 The appendix contains more details on national sector policy changes in individual SAR countries. 
8 Market reform approaches have been influenced to a greater or lesser extent by the “standard sector 
reform” model, which gained prominence in policy and analytical circles in the early 1990s. The 
standard model for electricity reform involves the following reform sequence and steps (Victor, 2005; 
Jamasb, 2006): i) establishment of an independent sector regulator; ii) corporatization of state-owned 
enterprises; iii) establishment of laws for electricity sector liberalization; iv) unbundling (or vertical 
separation) of the main industry segments (generation, transmission, distribution); v) implementation 
of more incentive-based regulation of electricity networks, to induce improved performance; vi) 
establishment of a wholesale electricity market; vii) privatization; and viii) introduction of independent 
power producers (IPPs). 
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horizontally unbundled with separate entities, catering to the requirements of the rural 
and urban areas. A legislative initiative has been advanced to unbundle the Nepal 
Electricity Authority. However, the fate of this remains unclear due to the persistent 
political uncertainty in the country. 
 
Table 2: Status of major reform elements in South Asia 
Source: Compiled by the Authors. 
Country 
Nominal 
generation 
market structure 
Initiation of private 
ownership and/or 
participation: 
Introduction 
of legally 
independent 
regulator 
Transmission 
Arrangement 
Genera-
tion 
Trans-
mission 
Distri-
bution 
Bangladesh Multiple sellers, single buyer 1992   2003 
Unbundled 
transmission 
owner 
Bhutan Multiple sellers, single buyer 2008    
Vertically 
integrated 
India 
competition with 
organized trading, 
but includes SOEs 
1991 2000 
1999 
(Orissa); 
2002 
(Delhi) 
1996 
(Orissa); 
1998 
(national) 
Unbundled 
transmission 
and 
independent 
system 
operator9 
Nepal Multiple sellers, single buyer 1992   1994/2011 
Vertically 
integrated 
Pakistan Multiple sellers, single buyer 1994 1995 
1998 
(KESC) 1995 
Unbundled 
transmission 
owner 
Sri Lanka Multiple sellers, single buyer 1996   2002/2009 
Vertically 
integrated 
 
The ownership of the generation segment is mixed.  There is private sector 
participation in the form of IPPs in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 
However, the bulk of generation assets remain state-owned, and many of the IPPs 
constitute small-scale and costly plants that started operation as a response to crises in 
electricity availability, particularly in Bangladesh and Pakistan. 
 
Transmission and distribution remain largely under government ownership across the 
region.  In India, private investors are permitted to invest in creation of transmission 
																																																								
9	System	operator	continues	to	be	bundled	with	the	transmission	utility	at	the	state‐level.	
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infrastructure under a license. A number of transmission links have been created in 
this manner including those between Bhutan and India, which have been constructed 
under a joint ownership agreement between the private investors and the government 
of India. The Indian states of Delhi and Orissa,10 and one distribution area in Pakistan 
(in Karachi) are the only examples of privatized electricity distribution in the region.  
 
Independent regulatory commissions have been introduced in the majority of SAR 
countries.  The process is still pending in Nepal (Nepal and Jamasb, 2012a), and 
remains partially implemented in Bhutan. More generally, the reform process has 
been slow in most of the SAR countries. In Sri Lanka, for example, a new Electricity 
Act was enacted only in 2009. Even in India, where the reform process has operated 
for almost two decades, politics and reform remain intertwined (Dubash and Rao, 
2008; Tongia, 2007).   
 
In India, market-oriented reform has had to face a number of challenges, although 
market-oriented activity including short-term competitive power markets is increasing 
(Littlechild, 2013). There is evidence that reform in India since the early 1990s has 
improved operational efficiencies (Cropper et al 2011), though effects are not 
necessarily realized immediately (Sen and Jamasb, 2012).  While the country has 
embraced deeper market reforms that improved competition in the generation sector, 
the distribution sector continues to exhibit serious operational inefficiency as well as 
financial losses (Pargal and Ghosh Banarjee, 2014). 11  Losses also are serious in 
Bangladesh and Pakistan, where prices remain below cost-recovery levels and, in 
Pakistan, rate increases approved by the regulator are overridden by the legislature.  
 
4.2 Performance of National Electricity Policy Reforms  
The reforms in the electricity sector in most of the SAR countries have been aimed 
mainly at enhancing operational performance, with relatively less emphasis on being 
“market-oriented”. India remains an exception by opening up the sector to 
competition and adopting market-oriented policies.  To accomplish the objective of 
																																																								
10All four electricity distribution companies in Orissa were privatized (three distribution companies to 
BSES Ltd, now Reliance Energy Ltd., and one to AES of USA). Due to regulatory and legal issues, 
however, AES exited the business and the control of that company fell back to the state government.	
11Wolak (2008) argues that India’s institutions for electricity regulation themselves need significant 
restructuring to support restructuring of the country’s power sector. 
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improving operational and financial performance of the sector, it is important that 
reforms include cost-reflective electricity pricing and effective targeting of electricity 
subsidies to improve the financial viability of the sector, as well as gradually opening 
up the sector to increased competition.  
 
The lack of cost reflective pricing in SAR has been a major contributor to financial 
problems of national power sectors. The inability of the sectors to generate sufficient 
surplus has affected the ability of the electric utilities to invest in capacity additions 
for electricity generation, transmission, and distribution.  It also has stunted incentives 
for private sector entry in generation, even if the entry barriers for the same have been 
lowered or removed.  Poor financial and operational performance in the electricity 
sectors of SAR countries reflects weaknesses in the structure and governance of the 
sector (Bhattacharya, 2007).  
 
Many of the anticipated benefits of reforms have been realized only to a limited 
extent, if at all. The performance indicators summarized in Table 3 provide evidence 
supporting these assertions.12 The specific problems include the following: 
 
(i) Insufficient investment in generation capacity. 
The pace of growth in investments in power generation across the SAR remains slow; 
it does not match the growth in electricity demand of existing consumers, or to the 
new consumers gaining electricity access. The result is a large number of rolling 
power outages (Nayar et al, 2012). For example, some rural areas in Pakistan 
experienced load shedding and blackouts up to 20 hours a day in 2012, while Nepal 
also experienced up to 14-hour daily power outages in 2013 (Sovacool et al., 2013). 
Against a peak demand of 6500 MW, Bangladesh experienced load shedding of 1000-
1200 MW in 2011 (GoB, 2014a). Sri Lanka, which remains significantly dependent 
on hydro-electric generation, is prone to electricity shortages during droughts, even 
though the average shortages remain as low as two hours a day. Peak demand and 
energy shortages in India declined from 11.51 % and 17.97 %, respectively, in 1996-
97, to 4.2 % and 4.5 %, respectively, by 2013-14, while the share of private 
investment grew to 34% by the end of March 2014 compared to a meager 3.6 % at the 
																																																								
12 Kessides (2012) shows that these conditions persist in a number of developing countries, even after 
more than two decades of sectoral reforms and restructuring. 
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end of November 1994. Without that increase in private investment, power shortages 
could have been higher. 
Table 3: Power sector performance indicators in South Asia (selected countries) 
 
Installed 
capacity 
(MW) 
Peak 
demand 
met(MW) 
Peak 
demand 
(MW) 
IPPs/Private 
Sector share 
in installed 
capacity 
(%) 
Electricity 
access rate 
(%)* 
Technical 
losses (% of 
generation) 
Per capita 
electricity 
consumpti
on (kWh) 
Bangladesh 8537 6434 8349 16.35 60 14.36 213 
India # 243028 126793 $ 131943 $ 34.0 75 23.65 917 
Nepal 720  569.6**  1094.6 33.33  76 25.03 106 
Pakistan 23412 13445 18467 35.56  69 17 450 
Sri Lanka 3312 2112*** 2146 33.15 85 14 490 
Sources: Bangladesh (BPDB, 2014); Nepal (NEA, 2013); Sri Lanka (CBSL, 2013), India (CEA, 2014); 
Pakistan (Kessides, 2013), * IEA (2011), ** excludes electricity imports capacity from India, *** based on 
1.2 GW hydro plant not running during drought seasons, # As on March 2014, $ For March 2014 
 
There are estimates indicating that inadequate power supply imposes significant costs 
on South Asian economies.  For example, the cost of load shedding to the Pakistani 
economy was estimated to be PKR 1,272 billion (Pakistani Rupees) in 2011-12, 
equivalent to 6% of the economy (Saeed, 2013). Table 4, based on data from World 
Bank enterprise surveys, provides an assessment of the direct loss of economic output 
by electricity users due to electricity outages in South Asian countries, along with 
additional statistics indicating the degree of service unreliability in the region. 
 
(ii) Low operational efficiency and service quality.   
Technical losses (both transmission and distribution) are estimated to average 14–
25% of electricity generation in the region (Smith, 2004).  The technical losses are 
particularly high in Nepal, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The poor physical condition of 
the transmission and distribution (T&D) networks in the face of networks investment 
inadequacy is one of the important causes of high network losses (Palit and Chaurey, 
2011). Lower T&D losses have been achieved by the relatively more efficient 
distribution utilities in India, and in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. This indicates in turn 
thatmuch of the observed T&D losses of 35-40% across states in India are due to non-
technical reasons. Lack of metering of all consumers remains a challenge for the 
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utilities and the regulatory commissions to arrive at an accurate estimate of network 
losses, and to separate out non-technical from technical losses (Singh, 2006).  
 
Table 4: Loss of economic output due to electrical outages and impact 
unreliable electricity supply on busineess activity 
Source: World Bank (2013) and Nayar et al. (2012) 
Country 
Economic value 
lost by enterprises 
due to electrical 
outages 
(As a % of sales) 
Average time of 
outages per month 
(hours) 
Percentage of 
firms citing 
electricity 
availability or 
reliability as a 
major or severe 
constraint for 
growth 
Percentage of 
firms owning 
generators 
Afghanistan (2007) 6.4 280 66 71 
Bangladesh (2007) 10.6 113 78 52 
Bhutan (2009) 4.3 8 6 18 
India (2006) 6.6 --- 32 41 
Nepal (2009) 27.0 226 76 16 
Pakistan (2007) 9.2 69 74 26 
South Asia overall 10.7 139 53 43 
 
The non-technical electricity losses due to power theft can involve fraud (meter 
tampering), stealing (illegal connections), billing irregularities such as non-payment, 
and corruption (Smith, 2004). In April 2014, power was cut off in 18 government 
buildings in Pakistan including the Presidential residence because of nonpayment of 
electricity bills. In Bangladesh, electricity theft was estimated to be at 14%. In India, a 
third of electricity is lost through non-technical losses each year (Min and Golden, 
2014).  
 
(iii) Weak financial performance.  Electricity losses translate to lost revenues to the 
power companies and poor service quality, Revenue inadequacy, due to both non-
technical losses and distorted tariffs, remains one of the grave concerns of the state-
owned electric utilities in South-Asia. In Bangladesh, for example, accounts 
receivable, due to the electricity bills not paid, was equal into 8.7 months of unpaid 
electricity consumption in 1999- 2000. This improved to about 2 months by 2013-14 
in a decade of electricity reform experience (GoB, 2014b). For its part, the Nepal 
Electricity Authority incurred a financial loss of Nepalese Rupees (NPR) 4 billion in 
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2012 due to overstaffing, weak management and heavy electricity leakage despite the 
tariff hike (NEA, 2013).13  
 
During the 1990s, amounts due by the State Electricity Boards in India to central 
power sector utilities, coal companies and the railways rose to INR 414.7 billion (GoI, 
2001). In 2002, following a one-time tripartite settlement, amounts due began to be 
securitized by the respective state governments (Singh, 2006).14 However, mounting 
debts now face state electric utilities.  The accumulated financial losses of the power 
sector in India increased from INR 190 billion in March 2005 to over INR 1070 
billion by March 2010 (GoI, 2011).  Total receivables for the power sector utilities 
swelled from INR 3100 billion in March 2005 to over INR 5600 billion in March 
2010 (GoI, 2011).   In some states the arrearages were the equivalent of well over a 
year of unpaid power consumption.15 
 
In Pakistan, the sector is suffering from a growing “circular debt” problem. The 
circular debt arises when an operating entity facing problems with outstanding 
receivables holds back payments to its suppliers and creditors (Kessides, 2013). The 
lack of payments affects various government departments, generation and distribution 
companies under the control of KESC and PEPCO, domestic and international fuel 
suppliers, and refineries in the Pakistani power sector.  They affect the fiscal position 
of the government as a whole.   
 
The circular debt in the power sector had reached PKR 537.5million in 2011, with the 
potential to lead to shutdown of generation plants and further worsening of demand-
supply imbalances in the power sector (Javaid, 2012). The new government at the 
time settled the existing circular debt through a one-time government subvention of 
PKR 480 billion in July 2013. However, the issue re-emerged soon afterwards, 
highlighting the fact that the underlying causal factors had not been effectively 
addressed. A report commissioned by the Planning Commission of Pakistan identifies 
the main source to be a difference between the “tariff differential subsidy” (TDS) the 
government claims to pay to distribution companies versus the amount actually 
																																																								
13One US Dollar= NRS. 97 and PKRS. 98 (as of May,2014) and one INR. = 160 NPR. 
14 See also Dossani (2004) for discussion of the reorganization of the Indian distribution sector. 
15 Additional details are in Pargal and Ghosh Banarjee (2014).  
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disbursed. A second cause is the T&D losses that distribution companies are allowed 
by NEPRA for tariff determination are lower than the actual levels (GoP, 2013). State 
Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) grapple with a similar situation in India 
(Singh, 2006). 
 
(iv) Limited involvement of the private sector.  Attracting foreign and domestic capital 
through private sector participation in the power sector was one of the major 
objectives of reforms in SAR (Victor and Heller, 2007). Hence, IPPs were allowed to 
sell electricity to the grid under state supported long-term contracts in the SAR. 
Reforms in the region thus have had some success in attracting private sector 
participation in power generation. For example, in both Nepal and Sri Lanka, IPPs’ 
share of installed generation capacity increased from 21% in 200416 to around 33% in 
2012 (see Table 3 above). In India, the share of the private sector in the electricity 
generation capacity has grown to more than 34% by the year 2014 (CEA, 2014). In 
Pakistan, the share of the private sector increased from 30% in 2004-05 to 49.34% by 
June 2013 (GoP, 2013). In Bangladesh, the share of private sector in total generation 
capacity was 40% in July 2014.17  Nonetheless, many IPP projects built rapidly to 
address electricity shortages are small in scale and not cost-effective.  
 
Privatization of electricity distribution remains a politically sensitive decision in the 
region. The Indian state of Orissa was home to the first experiment, in 1999, with 
privatization of electricity distribution in the region. The initial hiccups in this 
exercise postponed further attempts at privatization elsewhere. Privatization of 
electricity distribution in Delhi, in 2002 was remodeled based on the experience in 
Orissa: it incorporated performance milestones based bidding criteria with declining 
government support.  Evidence indicates that these and other privatized distribution 
companies have considerable decreases in technical and commercial power losses 
(IDFC, 2010). Privatization of electricity distribution in Karachi faced political 
hurdles, making it difficult to implement similar process elsewhere in the country. 
																																																								
16See Bhattacharya (2007) for the 2004 data on IPPs’ share in generation capacity. 
17Most of the private sector investments in the electricity sector in South Asia are based on the private 
sector choosing to invest by itself, though there also have been some Public-Private Partnerships 
(PPPs). The PPPs have mainly occurred in the power generation segment under build-operate-operate 
(BOO) arrangements such as in India. 
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Nonetheless, there is little happening at present in moving toward broader 
privatization in the distribution segment. 
 
4.3. Implications of Limited National Sector Reforms on Development of Cross-
Border Electricity Cooperation and Trade 
Domestic power sector reforms have an important bearing on the prospects for 
success in cooperation, cross-border and ultimately regionally (Belyaev, 2011). In 
particular incomplete domestic power sector reforms can create barriers for 
facilitating wider electricity cooperation. Some of these barriers are easy to infer from 
the discussion in the previous subsections.  Domestic policy distortions, including 
investment recovery rules and subsidies in pricing, reduce incentives for expanding 
generation investment for increased cross-border trade and limit the reward for 
expanding transmission capacity.  Underpriced electricity does not provide effective 
signals to attract private domestic and foreign investment, as the scope for earning a 
reasonable rate of return on the capital employed is low.  Moreover, investment risks 
will be higher when erstwhile partners in cross-border investment and trade are in a 
weak financial condition and may not be able to deliver on promised levels and 
quality of service.   
 
Weak laws and policies may provide electric utilities with substantial potential to 
exercise domestic market power. This, in turn, can create barriers to entry for new 
players in a regional market, even to the point of making competition unsustainable 
(Green, 2003). Market power issues remain important, as reforms have on many 
occasions failed to adequately address them (Newbery, 2002). The strong opposition 
to opening of domestic markets to foreign imports and the resulting interest in anti-
competitive policies and practices should not be underestimated (ESMAP, 2010).  
Weak markets due to regulatory distortions can also complicate long-term contracting 
for power and make financing cross-border electricity trade more challenging, in 
particular by creating regulatory risks and limiting options for trading partners.  
 
As previously noted, effective cross-border trade requires institutional capacities for 
tracking electricity flows, maintaining grid integrity, collecting and transferring 
revenues, and resolving disputes, among other functions.  Inefficient and inertia-
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bound domestic electricity sector policies and regulatory institutions impede 
establishment of the desired quality of cross-border coordination.   
 
5. Conclusions and Implications  
Expanded electricity cooperation in SAR can play an important role in long-term 
economic development of the region. This paper has analyzed the existing state of 
electricity cooperation in SAR, and considered barriers to increased cross-border 
cooperation and trade.  Some policy, institutional, and political barriers operate at the 
regional level:  lack of confidence and trust, trade-restrictive policies, and challenges 
in creating effective regional bodies for cross-border coordination. 
 
In addition, political instability and uncertainty and political economy related issues 
that have limited reforms in regulation of the sector at the national level and led to 
disappointing sectoral performance also adversely affect opportunities for cross-
border electricity cooperation and trade in the region.  Sector performance in South 
Asia continues to be characterized by chronic revenue inadequacy, deteriorating fixed 
assets and equipment, poor service quality, and severe problems of theft and unpaid 
bills. Slow progress in addressing these problems also has slowed progress toward 
achieving greater electricity cooperation and trade in SAR.  
 
Initiatives to engage in cross-border trade of electricity predate the onset of modern 
domestic power sector reforms.  Domestic market reforms are not a precondition for 
developing cross-border electricity trade, as demonstrated by existing electricity 
trading arrangements in South Asia. However, power sector reforms in participating 
countries provide a significant boost to the development of a well-functioning 
regional electricity market with substantial shared gains for the countries of the 
region.  
 
Conversely, stronger regional cooperation and trade in electricity can help strengthen 
domestic sector performance. Cross-border electricity cooperation can help bolster 
competition in national markets under market-based reforms.18  It can also improve 
																																																								
18For example, Nordpool, as the largest advanced integrated regional wholesale electricity market in 
the world, has performed well in terms of economic efficiency and competition and provides a good 
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the functional efficiency of both electricity producers and national regulators, which 
need to respond effectively to partners in other countries as well as domestic 
circumstances. 
 
The absence of an SAR level body with adequate resources and influence to help 
coordinate these elements hinders the intensification of electricity cooperation and 
trade in the region beyond individual bilateral transactions. A minimum degree of 
regulatory harmonization is needed for open access to and nondiscriminatory 
allocation of transmission, without which a power market providing customer choice 
and competitive returns to private investors cannot flourish. This includes congestion 
management and transmission pricing.  Cross-border electricity trade is also 
hampered without a system for energy metering, accounting, clearing and payment. 
 
Participation in cross-border electricity trade need not expand all-at-once and at all 
levels, but can develop in a somewhat piecemeal fashion, with greater opportunities 
for expanding trade in nations that have adopted widespread electricity market 
reforms. Policies toward regional electricity integration in SAR can follow a three-
track approach based on the existing status of the power sector reforms. In the short 
term, increased bilateral arrangements between countries based on increased 
interconnections and cross-border trade can be achieved. This will require agreements 
based on relatively simple rules for operating the bilateral interconnections between 
countries.  
 
In the medium term, increased sub-regional integration also involving third parties 
(such as trade between Nepal and Bangladesh with India as a transit country) can 
grow. This level of electricity cooperation will require harmonizing access rules, grid 
codes and protocols and electricity transmission charges.   Participating countries also 
can access short-term power markets in India (and elsewhere as they develop) to meet 
domestic requirements, as Nepal and Bangladesh already are doing to their advantage. 
 
Intensifying bilateral electricity cooperation in the short and medium term can 
catalyze and harmonize electricity reforms in the region in the long term. However, 
																																																																																																																																																														
example of a fuller integration of multiple national electricity systems into a regional market (Glachant 
and Levque, 2009).	
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deeper cooperation arrangements are best pursued in the presence of a regional 
market for power; an organization or forum for cross-country coordination that can 
help sustain agreements on market access, among other elements; and an institutional 
mechanism for coordinating and maintaining transmission in an effective and 
nondiscriminatory manner. Deeper levels of electricity cooperation in turn will 
depend on a greater degree of harmonization of reforms in national electricity 
markets, a gradual process. The different stages of regional cooperation can co-exist 
and gradually converge as sector reforms in the region progress. It must be 
emphasized, however, that gains from regional cooperation will be limited without 
development of market institutions and coordination institutions/forum, in addition to 
the desired domestic policy reforms. 
 
Strong political will and policy continuity remain crucial for achieving higher levels 
of electricity cooperation considering the lengthiness of the cooperation process. 
Dismantling political barriers in South Asia to regional electricity cooperation and 
installing greater economic rationalization in the domestic electricity sectors is indeed 
challenging but certainly possible.  
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APPENDIX  
Electricity Sector Reforms In SAR Countries 
 
Here we take a closer look at key individual country experiences and issues.19 
 
A.1. India 
Power sector reforms in India started in 1991 with the introduction of IPPs as the 
country faced a severe balance of payment crisis while the performance of the state-
owned utilities prior reforms was poor. As such, it is “difficult to imagine more 
adverse initial conditions” for any electricity restructuring than were present in India 
at the time of reforms (Wolak, 2008). The first step towards reform included 
unbundling of the erstwhile state electricity boards (SEBs) and setting up independent 
State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs). Beginning with Orissa in 1995, 
the process was imitated in nine other states. All these states unbundled the state 
electricity board by creating several distribution companies, one transmission and 
bulk supply company 20  and several distribution companies (Bhattacharya, 2007, 
Singh, 2006). The Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act of 1998 led to setting up 
of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC), and enabled setting up of 
the SERCs in the remaining states by invoking this federal labour legislation, instead 
of state-level legislation as used by previously reforming states in 2003.  However, 
this did not happen until 2003 while ggeneration 21  and transmission were not 
privatized in both the States. 
 
Enactment of the Electricity Act 2003 led to deepening of the reform process by 
lowering market barriers through de-licensing of generation and introduction of non-
discriminatory open access of the transmission network, and open access of the 
distribution network, in phases (Singh, 2010). It is considered as the most 
comprehensive policy in the region by far (Dossani, 2004; Sinha, 2005; Ryan, 2013). 
This ushered in an era of 'competition in the market' by introducing licensed traders 
and by enabling setting up of the power exchanges to encourage wholesale electricity 
																																																								
19 Information on electricity policies in SAR countries also can be found in ADB (2013). 
20 This bulk supply company acted as a single buyer to purchase electricity from all sources and then 
sell it onward to the distribution companies. This is known as the single buyer model (SBM). 
21 49% holding of Orissa Power Generation Company, the generation company of Orissa was sold to a 
private investor. 
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trade as a separate activity from the network segments. An Amendment to the 
Electricity Act 2003 was introduced in 2007 permitting captive power generators to 
supply power directly to consumers. The country currently has two power exchanges 
selling dispatchable electricity products, which are primarily dominated by the Day 
Ahead Market (DAM). In 2012-13, the short-term electricity market, comprised of the 
trades brokered through the licensed traders and those through the power exchanges, 
accounted for about 11% of the total electricity generated in the country (Singh et al., 
2013). Table A-1 below provides a timeline of the power sector developments in 
India. 
 
A.2. Bangladesh 
In Bangladesh, the electricity sector experienced changes as early as in 1977 with the 
creation of the Rural Electrification Board and establishment of 70 large distribution 
cooperatives within it (Rahman, 2008). The pre-reform initiatives such as unbundling 
initiatives started in early 1990 with the establishment of the Dhaka Electricity Supply 
Authority (DESA). The first IPP entered in 1992 although the plant was 
commissioned in 1998. A Power Cell was created under the Ministry of Energy in 
1995 to drive power sector reforms and promote economic development in 
Bangladesh, along with adoption of a National Energy Policy. The Private Sector 
Power Generation Policy of Bangladesh, issued in 1996, opened up power generation 
to both local and foreign private investors, offering a number of incentives. 
Restructuring in the sector continued as the existing utilities were corporatized and 
their business was reorganised. A long spell of inactivity in the reform process ended 
in 2003, as the Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission (BERC) was established 
through a legislative initiative and began operation from the next year. The reform 
process included functional unbundling and independent sector regulation (Alam et 
al., 2004). Power Grid Company of Bangladesh Limited (PGCB) and Dhaka Electric 
Supply Company Limited (DESCO) were formed in 1996 (see Table A-2). Foreign 
investment in the sector was also allowed in the same year. PGCB is a legally 
unbundled system operator for the electricity transmission network in the country. 
PGCB was to take over the transmission assets from the Bangladesh Power 
Development Board (BPDB), which was established in 1972. However, it took seven 
years for the transfer to be completed (GoB, 2004). Table A-2 below provides a 
timeline of the power sector developments in Bangladesh. 
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Table A-1: Timeline of power sector development in India 
Year Description 
1991 India Electricity Act (1910) and Electricity Supply Act (1948) amended to attract IPPs (Private Power Policy) 
1995 Mega Power Policy; reforms in the state of Orissa; setting up of Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission 
1997 Reforms in the state of Haryana; setting up of Haryana Electricity Regulatory Commission 
1998 
Reforms in the state of Andra Pradesh (AP); setting up of AP Electricity 
Regulatory Commission; Act to set up CERC and SERCs; Electricity 
Laws (amended); Act to allow private participation in transmission 
1994 Private Power and Infrastructure Board (PPIB) established to facilitate private investors. 
1997 National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) created as an autonomous regulatory agency. 
2000 Availability based tariff introduced in Western Region 
2001 
Energy Conservation Act; Accelerated Power Development Programme, 
Electricity Bill introduced in Parliament, Accelerated Power Development 
and Reform Programme launched 
2002 Benefits of Mega Power Policy Extended; Restructuring of Delhi Vidyut Board (DVB) and Privatisation of three distribution companies  
2003 Electricity Act 2003 enacted; de-licensing thermal generation and to allow open access to usher in a competitive era 
2004 Guidelines for Determination of Tariff by Bidding Process for Procurement of Power by Distribution Licensees 
2006 Tariff Policy lays out framework for tariff determination including subsidy surcharge. 
2006 
A scheme for developing is nine Ultra Mega Power Projects (UMPPs), 
each having a capacity of about 4000 MW, based on coal pit head, and 
offshore locations using imported coal. 
2007 Amendment to the Electricity act 2003; captive power generators allowed to supply power directly to consumers 
2008 
Re-structured Accelerated Power Development and Reforms 
Programme (APDRP) launched with a focus on actual, demonstrable 
performance in terms of sustained loss reduction. 
2010 
Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission launched to the add 20,000 MW 
of grid connected solar, 2000 MW off-grid solar applications and 
20,000,000 m² solar collectors. 
2010 Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) mechanism introduced to develop a economically efficient national market for renewable energy. 
2014 
Electricity (Amendment) Bill proposes to introduce supplier choice for 
retail consumers and address regulatory gaps, but also seems to 
compromise regulatory independence. 
Source: Updated from Singh (2006, 2010) 
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Table A-2: Timeline of power sector development in Bangladesh 
Year Description 
1972 Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) established. 
1977 Rural Electrification Board (REB) established as the semi-autonomous government agency to accelerate rural electricity access. 
1978 REB started functioning and conceived 1st project 
1991 Dhaka Electricity State Authority (DESA) created. 
1993 A high power inter-ministerial Committee on 'Power Sector Reform' constituted. 
1995 Power Cell, created under Ministry of Energy & Mineral Resources, to drive power sector reforms and to promote private power development. 
1996 Private Sector Power Generation Policy of Bangladesh opens up power generation to both local and foreign private investments, and offers a number of incentives. 
1998 Policy Guideline for Small Power Plant (SPP) in Private Sector issued to encourage investors to setup plants up to 10 MW on Build Own Operate (BOO) basis. 
1996 National Energy Policy adopted. 
1996 Dhaka Electric Supply Company Limited (DESCO) incorporated with the ultimate objective of taking over all assets of DESA. 
1996 Power Grid Company Limited of Bangladesh (PGCB) incorporated to take over transmission assets of BPDB and DESA by December 2002. 
1998 Power Division established in 1998 under the Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources. 
1998 DESA Act as amended to restructure Dhaka Electric Supply Authority (DESA) into a corporate body with an independent Board of Directors. 
1998 DESCO commences commercial operation by taking over Mirpur area from DESA. 
1998 Policy Guideline for Small Power Plant (SPP) in Private Sector approved, 
2000 Vision Statement and Policy Statement on Power Sector Reforms released. 
2002 Transmission assets of DESA (other than those that form integral part of DESA operation) handed over to PGCB. 
2003 Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission (BERC) established. 
2003 PGCB completes taking over of all the transmission assets and operating them. 
2004 Private Sector Power Generation Policy of Bangladesh revised. 
2008 Renewable Energy Policy of Bangladesh issued to harness the country's renewable energy resources through public as well as private investment. 
2008 Policy Guideline for Small Power Plant (SPP) in Private Sector revised. 
2008 Policy Guidelines for Enhancement of Private Participation in the Power Sector issued. 
2009 The Renewable Energy Policy of Bangladesh adopted. 
2010 Power System Master Plan 2010 (PSMP 2010) prepared. 
2010 
Power and Energy Fast Supply Enhancement (Special Provision) Act enacted to enable 
the government to bypass the tendering process for setting up new generation plant and 
transmission facilities for a period of two years. 
2011 Power and Energy Sector Road Map outlines the strategy for increasing generation capacity. 
2013 A 500 MW back-to-back HVDC interconnection completed with India. This allows import of up to 500 MW of electricity. 
2014 Sustainable & Renewable Energy Development Authority (SREDA) set up as a nodal agency for renewable energy, energy efficiency and energy conservation. 
Source: Compiled from GoB (2014a, 2014b) 
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In 2004, Bangladesh revised its policy for private sector investment in generation. 
Separate guidelines were also issued for promoting small power plants and setting up 
renewable energy based power generation facilities in the country. In 2010, a Power 
System Master Plan was prepared. It has forecasted peak electricity demand to grow 
from 6454 MW in 2010 to 33,708 MW in 2030. To meet this demand, the country 
would need to develop significant additional electricity generation capacity 
domestically, and explore importing electricity from neighboring countries in the 
region. Bangladesh also aims to achieve 100% household electrification by 2021, a 
challenging task given that the country was able to achieve 49% electrification by 
2011 (GoB, 2011). In 2010, the government put in place a Power and Energy Fast 
Supply Enhancement (Special Provision) Act, empowering it to bypass the tendering 
process for setting up new generation plant and transmission facilities for a period of 
two years. This led to signing of contracts with 25 firms to setup about 3000 MW of 
generation capacity (Ebinger, 2010). These high price contracts necessitated 
considerable subsidies by the government to hold down retail electricity prices to 
individual consumers (GoB, 2014a). 
 
A.3. Pakistan 
Growing electricity shortages in Pakistan during the 1970s and the first half of 1980s 
prompted the government to take initiatives to encourage private sector participation 
in generation of electricity (see Table A-3). A policy document was prepared by the 
Committee on Private-Sector Power Generation for the Economic Coordination 
Committee in 1985. This policy provided a framework, as a pre-reform initiative, for 
private investment in utility scale power plants, which would sell electricity to the 
then existing electric utilities: the Water and Power Development Authority 
(WAPDA), and the Karachi Electric Supply Company (KESC) (Little, 1986). 
 
The Power Policy of 1994 opened the generation sector for hydropower projects to 
private investment by offering better incentives in terms of lucrative tariffs with 
capacity charges, and guaranteed payments and fuel cost pass through as well as 
indexation to offset changes in foreign exchange rates and inflation (ADB, 2000). 
Further, the policy provided for fiscal incentives, including exemption from income 
tax, sales tax and, custom duty for import of plant and machinery. The Private Power 
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and Infrastructure Board (PBIB) was created in 1994 to facilitate and monitor private 
sector investment and infrastructure sectors, including power.  
 
Hydropower Policy 1995 was issued to attract private investment in development of 
hydroelectric projects by offering an attractive tariff, concessional import duty for 
import of plant and machinery, facilitation of financing the projects and 'take or pay' 
arrangement to ensure offtake of power from such projects. Although the “Policy 
Framework and Package for Incentives for Private Sector Transmission Line Projects 
in Pakistan” was issued in 1995 to provide attractive incentives to private investors to 
setup identified transmission lines across the country, investments did not materialize. 
The policy was tweaked recently in 2015 to provide greater clarity. Power Generation 
Policy 2002 specifically highlighted the role of the private sector in contributing 
significant capacity additions following a reform program in the country.  
 
An unfavorable macroeconomic environment due to regional-scale financial crises in 
the late 1990s created severe liquidity constraints on the public sector utilities, namely 
WAPDA and KESC, which deferred payments to IPPs. Nonetheless, this policy did 
not contribute towards privatization of KESC or unbundling of WAPDA. KESC was 
eventually privatized later in 2005. The National Electric Power Regulatory Authority 
(NEPRA) was established in 1995 based on a Presidential Ordinance. Later, 
enactment of the'Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric 
Power, as Act No. XL of 1997' led to its formal creation and notification. The five-
member commission is empowered to issue licenses, determine tariffs and set 
standards for performance (GoP, 1997). The transfer of KESC was only completed in 
2005, although the process started in 1996 with further capital restructuring carried 
out in 2002 and 2003 (Bhattacharya, 2007). The restructuring of WAPDA began in 
1998 through the creation of the Pakistan Electric Power Company (PEPCO), which 
was responsible for managing the transition of WAPDA from a bureaucratic structure 
to a corporate, commercially viable and productive entity (USAID, 2010). In 2007, 
thermal power generation, transmission, distribution and billing activities of WAPDA 
were entrusted to PEPCO. WAPDA remains responsible for water and hydropower 
development only. PEPCO is currently responsible for nine Distribution Companies 
(DISCOs), four Generation Companies (GENCOs) and a National Transmission 
Dispatch Company (NTDC). The NTDC was set up and commenced operation in 
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1998. These companies are working under independent Board of Directors and are 
administratively autonomous. WAPDA also owns and operates the Hyderabad 
Electric Supply Company (HESCO) commencing business in 1998. 
 
A.4. Sri Lanka 
The power sector in Sri Lanka is dominated by two utilities, namely Ceylon 
Electricity Board (CEB) and Lanka Electricity Company (LECO). CEB is an 
integrated utility composed of six business units fully owned by the government and 
engages in the generation (one), transmission (one) and distribution (four) of 
electricity (ADB, 2004). LECO was created in 1983 as a distribution company under 
the Companies Act No.17 of 1982 (later, the Companies Act No. 07of 2007). The 
CEB (50%) and the Government Treasury (44%) own most of its shares. In 1992, the 
CEB invited expression of interest (EOI) to set up generation plants in the country 
(Poulin and Roth, 1994), opening up the entry for IPPs. A severe drought during 1996 
led the government to promote IPP entry in thermal generation. A feasibility study for 
a 40 MW diesel based plant that was also commissioned in 1998.  
 
The restructuring efforts started in 1998 with the government establishing the Public 
Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka (PUCSL) in 2002 as a regulator for electricity, 
lubricants22 and water sectors under Act No. 35 of 2002 by the Parliament. PUSCL 
came into operation in 2003. The Commission regulates the generation, transmission, 
distribution, supply and use of electricity (PUSCL, 2014a). Initially, PUSCL was not 
empowered to determine tariffs but after the 2009 Act, the commission achieved real 
powers to regulate tariffs (Amarawickrama and Hunt, 2004). The Sri Lankan 
Parliament passed the Sri Lanka Electricity Act No. 20 of 2009 to replace the 
Electricity Reform Act 2002 with the major aim of empowering the PUSCL to 
effectively regulate the power sector (PUSCL, 2014b).  However the Act did not 
become fully effective because of factors such as changing governments and public 
opposition, limiting the PUSCL to its advisory roles only while the Act in itself had 
too little to empower the commission.  
 
  
																																																								
22 PUCSL is a shadow regulator of the lubricants market in Sri Lanka. Appropriate legislative 
initiatives were proposed to be undertaken to empower PUCSL to regulate the petroleum industry. 
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Table A-3: Timeline of power sector development in Pakistan 
Year Description 
1958 
Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) was established as a semi-
autonomous agency to coordinate the development of Pakistan's water and power 
resources. 
1992 Government prepared the strategic plan for the privatization of the power sector 
1992 National Pakistan Conservation Strategy (PNCS) was enacted, which was subsequently integrated into the ninth Pakistani energy plan (1993-1998). 
1994 Power Policy issued to invite independent power producers (IPPs) to invest in sector. 
1994 Private Power and Infrastructure Board (PPIB) established to facilitate private investors. 
1995 Policy Framework and Package for Incentives for Private Sector Transmission Line Projects in Pakistan 
1997 National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) created as an autonomous regulatory agency. 
2000 NEPRA directly attached with the Cabinet Division. 
2005 KESC privatized by offloading 73% stake. However, the winning bidder withdrew after four months. 
2008 Management control of KESC transferred to a new private entity. 
2010 New Ordinances make NEPRA to determine overall electricity tariff on a quarterly basis. 
2013 
National Power Policy 2013 issued by the Ministry of Water and Power. The policy 
identifies specific actions to achieve 9 goals including creation of additional capacity, 
encourage energy conservation is a, minimise inefficiencies of the distribution system 
and improving governance at all levels. 
2014 National Power Tariff and Subsidy Policy Guidelines 2014 
2014 NEPRA issues draft Competitive Bidding Tariff (Approval Procedure) Regulations, 2014 
2015 Revised Policy Framework for Private Sector Transmission Line Projects issued. It includes 10 year income tax exemption and other fiscal incentives. 
Source: Compiled from GoP (1997, 2013); NEPRA (2014) 
 
The Sri Lankan attempt over 25 years to privatize the CEB has faced mass opposition 
from trade unions fearing job losses. The government is keen to privatize the power 
sector as a means to raise money and relieve the financial burden of the heavily 
indebted CEB. An attempt to sell the CEB failed in 2002 due to protests by the 
workers while the passing of the power reform bill in 2009 also faced opposition from 
some trade unions.  
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The transmission, bulk purchase of power as well as distribution within its own areas 
remained a monopoly of the CEB. Competition was brought about by tendering 
requirement for procurement of power by the CEB. This was also modified later, see 
Table A-4 below. CEB's monopoly continues to remain as a single buyer of 
electricity. 
 
Sri Lanka Sustainable Energy Authority Act, No. 35 of 2007 aims to promote 
development of renewable energy based electricity generation by giving incentives to 
private investors. Sec. 16 (b) of Sri Lanka Electricity Act No. 20 of 2009, mandates a 
generation licensee to sell electricity to the transmission and bulk supply licensee, i.e. 
the CEB. Presence of the single buyer model (SBM) limits competition in the 
electricity sector in Sri Lanka.  reviewed the policy and regulatory environment and 
suggested the need for initiatives, including open access of the network to enable 
competition in the power sector in Sri Lanka. 
 
The Electricity Act of 2009 (Sec. 43(2)), introduced a semblance of competition by 
mandating competitive tendering process for procurement of electricity by the 
Transmission and Bulk Supply licensee (i.e. CEB). However, in 2013, Sri Lanka 
Electricity (Amendment) Act, No. 31 of 2013 dropped this tendering requirement for 
setting up new plants or expansion of existing power plantsunder an offer from a 
foreign sovereign government with the approval of theCabinet of Ministers. 
 
A.5. Nepal 
Pre-reform efforts and initiatives in electricity sector in Nepal started with the 
establishment of the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) by merging various state-
owned electricity entities in 1985, with the introduction of the NEA Act 1984. NEA 
remains vertically integrated with functional separation in terms of generation, 
transmission and distribution of electricity. The Department of Electricity 
Development (DOED) continues to be the licensing authority for generation, 
transmission and distribution of electricity in Nepal. 
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Table A-4: Timeline of power sector development in Sri Lanka 
Year Description 
1935 Electricity Board of Ceylon (EBC) established. 
1937 EBC and all functions of ECB transferred to its former department by renaming asthe Department of Government Electrical Undertakings (DGEU). 
1969 Ceylon Electricity Board Act, No. 17 of 1969, led to setting up of the CEB. 
1992 EDB invites expression of interest for setting up privately owned power plants. 
1993 
Lanka Electricity Company Limited (LECO) established to undertake, distribution
and supply of electricity in its franchise area along the coastal belt of the Western
Province and part of the Southern Province. 
2002 
Electricity Reform Act, No. 28 of 2002, enacted to regulate and restructure the
sector. However, its key provisions leading to unbundling of Ceylon Electricity
Board (CEB) and the Lanka Electricity Company Pvt. Ltd (LECO) are not yet
implemented. 
2002 Enactment of Public Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka Act, No. 35 of 2002 ,leading to setting up of the PUCSL, a multi-sector regulator including electricity. 
2002 
Sri Lanka Rural Electrification Policy issued to provide a level playing field between
grid connected and off grid renewable energy applications by providing transparent
subsidies, network access and cost-effective tariffs. 
2007 
Sri Lanka Sustainable Energy Authority set up under the Sri Lanka Sustainable
Energy Authority Act, No. 35 of 2007, to achieve sustainability in energy supply 
through development of indigenous resources and energy conservation. 
2008 
National Energy Policy & Strategies of Sri Lanka' incorporates 9 key elements
including ensuring basic energy needs, improving energy security, promoting
renewable energy, promoting energy conservation and adoption of course reflective
tariffs with targeted subsidies. 
2009 
Sri Lanka Electricity Act, No. 20 of 2009 strengthens the PUCSL to deliver on its
responsibilities, among others, for licensing, tariff setting, and setting technical and 
operational codes. 
2013 
Sri Lanka Electricity (Amendment) Act, No. 31 of 2013, does away with tendering 
requirement (Section 43) for setting up new plants or expansion of existing plants 
under an offer from a foreign sovereign Government with the approval of theCabinet
of Ministers. 
Source: Compiled from ADB (2004), PUSCL (2014b) 
 
The formulation of the Hydropower Development Policy 1992, Water Resources Act 
1992 and the Electricity Act, 204923 (1992) paved the way towards creating a legal 
framework for the corporatization of the power sector although corporatization efforts 
have not been exercised (ADB, 1999). The Hydropower Development Policy 1992 
opened the generation segment for IPPs, as the focus was to promote and facilitate 
																																																								
23 Nepali Year (NY). Year in parenthesis refers to the Gregorian year.	
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hydropower development while allowing for private sector participation. The NEA 
Act was amended to provide 'autonomy' to the NEA and it became a licensee to buy 
electricity generated by private IPPs's). The Electricity Tariff Fixation Rules 2050 
(1994) issued under Section 40 of Electricity Act, 2049 (1992)led to the establishment 
of the Electricity and Tariff Fixation Commission (ETFC) in 1994 to regulate 
electricity prices.  
 
The Hydropower Policy 2058 (2001) was issued with an intention to attract more 
foreign and domestic private sector investments, with ETFC to be developed as a 
regulatory body (Nepal and Jamasb, 2012a). The 2001 policy also recognized the 
need to develop hydropower as an 'exportable commodity' (GoN, 2001). ETFC 
revised electricity prices in 2001 by hiking the tariffs. The policy prompted 
establishment of the Independent Power Producers' Association Nepal (IPPAN) in 
2001 with the intention of encouraging private sector involvement in hydropower 
development.  
 
The Community Electricity Distribution Bylaw was introduced by the NEA in 2003 
with the objectives of promoting public participation in reducing non-technical power 
losses (such as theft), institutionalising distribution and encouraging community 
management in the extension of distribution lines through the distribution institution24 
(NEA, 2014). The aim of the initiative was to enable such institutions to extend 
distribution lines and purchase of electricity in bulk from NEA for selling it on to the 
consumers. 
 
Changes in leadership and political instability led to the ETFC being dissolved in 
2011 while a period of national ‘energy emergency’ was declared. Another change in 
political leadership later in the same year reinstated the status of ETFC. The ETFC 
subsequently approved a price hike for electricity in 2012, eleven years after the last 
price adjustment.  
 
  
																																																								
24 A 'Distribution Institution' can be a company, a cooperative, an association, an NGO or users 
association, duly registered under respective laws. 
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Table A-5: Timeline of power sector development in Nepal 
Year Description 
1984 Nepal Electricity Authority Act, 1984 enacted to set up Nepal ElectricityAuthority. 
1992 The Industrial Enterprises Act, 1992 enacted to facilitate investment inindustrial sectors including generation of electricity. 
1992 Water Resources Act, 2049 (1992) , enacted vesting ownership of waterresources with the government and mandating license for harnessing the same. 
1992 Hydropower Development Policy 2049 (1992) issued. 
1992 Electricity Act, 2049 (1992) enacted. It specifies rules to apply for licences toconduct survey, generation, transmission or distribution of electricity. 
1992 
The NEA Act amended to “enable the NEA to function autonomously”. NEA
transformed from being a a sole player to a licensee to buy electricity generated
by private IPPs's. 
1993 Electricity Regulations, 1993, introduced to operationalize the Electricity Act,1992 to enable entry of IPPs. 
2001 Electricity Leakage Control Act (2058), 2001 is enacted to reduce theft ofelectricity. 
2001 Hydro-Power Development Policy, (2058) 2001 issued to develop country'shydro resources including those for export purposes. 
2003 
NEA frames Community Electricity Distribution Bylaw 2060 (2003) to
encourage public participation in distribution and attract private investment for
rural electrification. This is followed by the establishment of Community Rural
Electrification Department (CRED). 
2006 
Rural Energy Policy 2006 issued to address, among others, the energy needs of
the rural population, creation of a rural energy subsidy scheme with clear
objectives and criteria for target groups and incorporation of rural energy
policies of ministries and institutions related to rural development. 
2008 
Amidst growing power shortages, a 38-point National Electricity Crisis
Resolution Action Plan (2065) 2008 was introduced. This includes provisions
for PPA at flat rate for power plants up to 25 MW, 7-year income tax holiday
and waiver of the provision for conducting Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) for projects expected to be implemented by Chaitra 2068 (2011). 
2013 
Subsidy Policy for Renewable Energy (2069) issued to increase access to
renewable energy to low-income households through subsidy and access to
credit, to support rural electrification and to attract private investors. 
Source: Compiled from Nepal and Jamasb (2012a); NEA (2014) 
 
In the meantime, the Hydropower Development Policy 2058 (2001) imposed a tax on 
electricity to be exported from the country (Singh et al., 2013).The proposed 
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Electricity Bill, 2065 and the Nepal Electricity Regulatory Commission Bill, 2065 
envisions regulatory reforms leading to setting up of the Nepal Electricity Regulatory 
Commission (NERC). Power sector reform in Nepal, hence, continues to lag behind 
other countries in the region in terms of the pace and the scope of reform in the power 
sector. 
 
